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The conflict in Kashmir, which erupted into near civil war in 1990, emerged out of a fifty-year political struggle for control of the territory. Both India and Pakistan claim control of Kashmir; the unresolved status of Kashmir continues to be the most serious impediment to ending tensions between the two South Asian enemies which many observers fear could lead to another, possibly nuclear, war.10 Although Kashmir has a majority Muslim population, it has had a long history of religious tolerance and a unique culture, referred to as Kashmiriyat, which combines elements of the three major religions which have flourished there: Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam. However, since the early 1950s, India's attempts to control the state through rigged elections and other political machinations fueled resentment among the state's Muslim political leaders, and ultimately led to the emergence of Muslim militant groups committed to fighting for independence. Such groups found ready support and arms in Pakistan. By 1990, popular resentment toward India's policies in the state had grown into a mass movement for azadi—independence. The militant groups which have been fighting for independence from India are divided between those who believe the territory should become part of Pakistan and those who believe that Kashmir should become an independent state. Some of the groups openly espouse an Islamist ideology; others advocate a secular Kashmiri state that would include Kashmiri Buddhists, Hindus and others. The Indian government has sought to hold Pakistan entirely responsible for the escalation in fighting that has taken place since 1989 and has blamed Pakistan for "exporting" Islamic fundamentalism to the state. Although Pakistan has taken advantage of the situation by providing arms and other support to the militants, in fact, the roots of the Kashmir crisis are indigenous and originate in India's central government's attempts to exert political control over the state.

The conflict has its origins in the state's disputed accession to India in 1947, when colonial British India was partitioned to create the nations of India and Pakistan. Kashmir's then ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, refused to accede to either nation, apparently in a bid to preserve Kashmir's independence.11 However, an invasion by Pakistani tribesmen12 in August and September 1947 and an uprising among Kashmiri Muslims in the state's western regions ultimately compelled the maharaja to seek the assistance of Prime Minister Nehru of India. Nehru agreed to send troops only if Kashmir formally acceded to India. On October 27, 1947, the maharaja agreed to Kashmir's accession to India on thecondition that Kashmir be permitted to retain its own constitution.13 Indian troops succeeded in halting the Pakistani forces, driving them back to the western third of the state, which then came under Pakistan's control as "Azad" (free) Kashmir.

The question of Kashmir's final status was never resolved, however. British authorities had urged that the question of Kashmir's accession be settled by a plebiscite as soon as law and order was reinstated and the invading forces had left. But the plebiscite was never held. The Indian government argued first that the essential precondition to a plebiscite, the exit of Pakistani troops from "Azad Kashmir," had not been met, and later that the Kashmiri people had effectively ratified accession by voting in local elections and adopting a state constitution. United Nations intervention achieved a cease-fire on January 1, 1949.

Through the 1950s and 1960s, political discontent with the central government's attempts to manipulate politics in the state grew, as successive state governments controlled by the central government eroded Kashmir's autonomy.14 Pro-independence and pro-plebiscite activists were repeatedly jailed. In 1964 the first militant group, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), was formed to fight for independence. On July 2, 1972, India and Pakistan signed the Simla Accord, under which both countries agreed to respect the cease-fire line and to resolve differences over Kashmir "by peaceful means" through negotiation. The Simla Accord left the "final settlement" of the Kashmir question to be resolved at an unspecified future date. Since then, the Simla Accord has been the touchstone of all bilateral discussions of the Kashmir issue, even though the accord itself left the issue unresolved.

In 1986, then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Farooq Abdullah, Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, forged a new accord, which was widely criticized in the state as a betrayal of Kashmiri interests. Charges of widespread corruption soon discredited Farooq Abdullah's National Conference party. A new opposition party, the Muslim United Front (MUF), which had the support of pro-independence activists, Islamic fundamentalists and many frustrated Kashmiri youth, was launched and contested the March 1987 polls for seats in the state assembly. Widespread irregularities in the vote count and mass arrests of MUF candidates in the election's aftermath caused a watershed in popular disillusionment with state politics and drove many to support emerging militant groups, including the powerful Hezb-ul Mujahedin, which reportedly had significant support from Pakistan. The major militant organizations were divided between those who advocate an independent Kashmir and those who support accession to Pakistan.

After the elections, militants of the JKLF and other groups stepped up their attacks on the government, detonating bombs at government buildings, buses and the houses of present and former state officials, and enforcing a state-wide boycott of the November 1989 national parliamentary elections. One month later, JKLF militants abducted the daughter of Home Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, then freed her when the government gave in to demands for the release of five detained militants. That event, together with a surge in popular protest against the state and central governments, led New Delhi to launch a massive crackdown on the militants. In response, the state government resigned in protest and governor's rule was declared on January 19, 1990.15 From the outset, that Indian government's campaign against themilitants was marked by widespread human rights violations, including the shooting of unarmed demonstrators, civilian massacres and summary executions of detainees. Militant groups—which received arms and training from Pakistan—stepped up their attacks, murdering and threatening Hindu residents, carrying out kidnapings and assassinations of government officials, civil servants and suspected informers and engaging in sabotage and bombings. Some 100,000 Hindu Kashmiris, known as "Pandits," and thousands of Kashmiri Muslims fled the valley. By May 1990, rising tension between Pakistan and India following the escalation of the conflict in Kashmir raised fears of another war between the two countries.

In mid-1992, the government launched a "catch-and-kill" policy to execute captured militants. That policy, together with the January 1993 massacre of at least forty civilians by BSF troops in Sopore, focused international attention on human rights violations in Kashmir. In late 1993, the All Parties Huriyat Conference, an umbrella organization of the leaders of all the political and militant organizations fighting for independence, was founded to act as the political voice of the independence movement. In October 1993, a militant siege at the Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar ended peacefully; however, forty demonstrators were shot dead by BSF troops in Bij Behara. In 1994, the government released several prominent political leaders, apparently as part of a government effort to pave the way for elections in the state.

On May 11, 1995, a two-month-long standoff between militants and the Indian army at a Sufi shrine in the town of Charar-e Sharief ended in catastrophe when the shrine was torched and it and most of the town burned to the ground. It was not clear who set the fire; the Indian government blamed the militants while most Kashmiris blamed the army. The disaster forced the Rao government to cancel its plans to hold elections.

Throughout 1995, Kashmiri militant groups increasingly resorted to the indiscriminate use of explosives, including car bombs and letter bombs, not only in Jammu, but in heavily-trafficked areas of Srinagar, where such attacks had been rare. Civilians were the principal victims. Many of these attacks appeared to be the work of Islamist groups whose leadership included Afghans and other non-Kashmiris. In November, the Federal Election Commission rejected government plans to schedule elections on the grounds that the security situation was not conducive to holding the polls.

In July 1995, a previously unknown militant group, Al Faran, kidnaped six tourists in Kashmir: two Americans, one of whom later escaped, two Britons, one German and one Norwegian. The group demanded the release of twenty-one detained militants, principally top members of the militant group, Harakat-ul Ansar. On August 13, police discovered the beheaded and mutilated body of the Norwegian hostage, Hans Christian Oster. The murder was widely condemned by political leaders and most other militant groups in the Kashmir valley. As this report went to press, the remaining hostages were still in Al Faran's custody.

As of May 1996, at least six major militant organizations, and several smaller ones, operate in Kashmir. Their forces are variously estimated at between 5,000 and 10,000 armed men. They are roughly divided between those who support independence and those who support accession to Pakistan. The oldest and most widely known militant organization, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), has spearheaded the movement for an independent Kashmir. Its student wing is the Jammu and Kashmir Students Liberation Front (JKSLF). A large number of other militant organizations have emerged since 1989, some of which also support independence, others of which support Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. Although all groups reportedly receive arms and training from Pakistan, the pro-Pakistani groups are reputed to be favored by Pakistan's military intelligence, the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).16 The most powerful of these is the Hezb-ul-Mujahedin. The other major groups are Harakat-ul Ansar, a group which reportedly hasa large number of non-Kashmiris in it, Al Umar, Al Barq, Muslim Janbaz Force and Lashkar-e Toiba, which is also made up largely of fighters from Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to press reports, several hundred fighters from Afghanistan and other Muslim countries have also joined some of the militant groups or have formed their own. The Harakat ul-Ansar group, a powerful militant organization which first emerged in 1993, is said to be made up largely of non-Kashmiris.

In the early years of the conflict, rivalries among the militant groups, and particularly between the dominant groups, sparked frequent clashes and often prevented the militants from coordinating military operations.17 In 1993, the All Party Huriyat Conference (APHC), an umbrella group of political and militant leaders, was formed to act as the official voice of the militant movement. However, rivalries within the APHC have limited its effectiveness. Charges of corruption have also tainted some APHC leaders.18

The militant forces do not control territory in Kashmir, but certain parts of the valley have gained a reputation as strongholds of particular militant groups, from which they have launched attacks on Indian government troops trying to conduct search operations in the vicinity. Many of these towns are along the supply lines for weaponry from Pakistan. However, the militants have lost considerable ground since the introduction of the state-sponsored paramilitary groups. These groups have gained control of pockets of territory throughout the valley.

The militants' military operations are generally characterized by ambushes of security force patrols and convoys and hit-and-run attacks on security force bunkers and pickets, for which they generally use grenades, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and anti-personnel and anti-tank mines. Some militant groups have organized commando units responsible for attacking specific targets, such as security force bunkers. The militants also engage army troops and other security forces in gun battles. For these operations they rely on weapons such as AK-47 and AK-56 assault rifles, light machine guns, revolvers and other light weapons. The militants are also reported to have sophisticated night vision and wireless communication equipment. The availability of this sophisticated weaponry has had a measurable impact on the effectiveness of the militants' military operations. Increasingly in 1996, the militants were reported to be making use of landmines. State-sponsored militias also use automatic rifles, grenades, revolvers and other small arms.

State authorities claim that over 13,500 AK series assault rifles, 700 rocket launchers, 16,000 grenades and 3,000 mines have been recovered since 1990. Much of this weaponry reaches Kashmir from Pakistan, and militant leaders freely acknowledge that they receive support from Pakistan's ISI. Officially, the Pakistani government has denied involvement in arming and training Kashmiri militants, but the claim is generally not considered credible.19

Government forces operating in Kashmir include the Indian Army and India's federal security forces, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the Border Security Force (BSF), and the Special Task Force. The army's role in the conflict expanded in 1993 with the introduction of the Rashtriya Rifles, an elite army unit created specifically for counterinsurgency operations in Kashmir. As of 1996, at least 300,000 troops were deployed in the valley, including those positioned along the Line of Control.20 The local Jammu and Kashmir policemen are generally not involved incounterinsurgency operations, largely because they are believed to be sympathetic to the insurgency.21 However, in 1995 the Special Task Force (STF), a counterinsurgency division of the Jammu and Kashmir Police, made up of mainly non-Muslim non-Kashmiri recruits, was formed apparently to create the impression that the counterinsurgency effort had local support. In each district, Special Task Force Operations are headed by the superintendent of police (SP) for operations.

Since at least early 1995 Indian security forces have armed and trained local auxiliary forces made up of surrendered or captured militants to assist in counterinsurgency operations. These forces, who wear no uniforms and operate outside of the normal command structure of the Indian army and other security forces, nevertheless are considered state agents under international law. These groups participate in joint patrols, receive and carry out orders given by security officers, and operate in full view of army and security force bunkers and camps. Some members of these groups are even housed in military compounds. They are generally referred to as "renegades" or "sarkari militants" or the "third force."

Militants who surrender and then become recruits for one of the paramilitary groups are apparently motivated by the pay and the opportunity to carry out attacks on former rivals without risk of being killed by the security forces. Ikhwan-ul Muslimoon, for example, has targeted Hezb-ul Mujahedin forces as well as members of Jamaat-e Islami in its attacks. Some recruits may have been rejected from a militant group; others may have family members who were victims of militant violence and join the state forces out of a desire for revenge. Some paramilitary recruits join for the chance to engage in other crimes with impunity. Ikhwan ul-Muslimoon has reportedly been involved in illegal timber sales of valuable teak and other woods. Although the security forces are aware of the operation, they have done nothing to stop it.22

The government has also forcibly recruited some paramilitary group members by detaining members of their families as hostages until the former militants agree to work with the security forces. The security forces have also recruited former militants who were themselves detained and tortured by the security forces. Human Rights Watch interviewed many detainees who were told by the security forces that the torture would end if they agreed to work with their captors.

The number of former militants in the state-sponsored militias is impossible to determine. There are reported to be four or five groups operating throughout the valley, and while each works with one or more of the security forces operating in Kashmir, the army has overall authority for them. The most prominent of the groups is Ikhwan-ul Muslimoon [Muslim Brotherhood], headed by Koko Parray, a folk singer and former JKLF militant. Parray commands the Hajan area; his deputy is Ansar-ul Haq who controls operations elsewhere and has been campaigning as an independent in the May 1996 elections. Ikhwan ul-Muslimoon is reportedly composed of former members of many of the militant organizations, most of whom had been detained by the security forces before joining the group. It works with the Rashtriya Rifles and with the State Task Force, a division of the Jammu and Kashmir Police created in 1995 of recruits from mostly outside the state. It functions in the Hajan area and in the Shivpura area of Srinagar.

The name of another paramilitary group, the Taliban, was reportedly deliberately chosen to create confusion with the militant Islamic Afghan group of the same name.23 Since the conflict in Kashmir began in 1990, the Indian governmenthas attempted to discredit militant organizations by claiming that the uprising was provoked by Pakistan and was not indigenous in origin. It has also accused the militants of espousing a militant Islamic ideology when that characterization is only true of some of the groups. Mia Bashir Ahmed, a powerful Congress leader in Kashmir, has been Taliban's principal patron. The Taliban works with the Indian army in Kashmir and operates in the area of Kangan on the outskirts of Srinagar. The Muslim Mujahedin, another group, operates around Anantnag and works with the STF. It has taken over many of the patrolling responsibilities of the security forces.

The BSF and the Rashtriya Rifles are financing their own paramilitaries. According to one press report, competition to claim a greater number of surrendered weapons and recruits has led to friction between army forces and Border Security Force (BSF).

In March 1996, the Indian biweekly newsmagazine India Today highlighted the role of paramilitary groups:

[They have become the] centerpiece of the counterinsurgency operations in the Valley ... Used initially as intelligence sources—to help in flushing-out operations—they are now also being used as "prowlers": they take part in the security forces' armed encounters with militants."...In fact, the security forces are raising "small armies" of surrendered militants in the Valley and, in the militancy-affected areas of Doda, are relying on them to even neutralize hard-core outfits like the Harkat-ul-Ansar (HUA), the Hizbul Mujahedin and the Lashkar-e-Toiba, all dominated by battle-hardened Afghan mercenaries. The police too are helping, though in a limited way ... "Special Operation Groups" comprising the police and the surrendered militants, holding high-powered wireless sets, masquerade as ultras [militants] and catch the genuine ones by surprise.24

By May 1996, political negotiations for resolving the crisis in Kashmir remained deadlocked, and in six years of war, the conflict had claimed at least 20,000 lives, and possibly many more.25 Weary of the war and disillusioned with the militants, many Kashmiris have nevertheless continued to express support for the independence movement. Despite the scheduling of parliamentary elections in May 1996, there were few indications that there would be an end to the abuses and the violence anytime soon.

10 China also claims and controls a small part of Kashmir bordering Tibet.

11 Kashmir was an important Buddhist center from the second century B.C. It was ruled by successive Hindu dynasties until it came under Muslim rule in the fourteenth century. It became part of the Sikh empire of Ranjit Singh in 1819. In 1846, after the Second Anglo-Sikh war, the British forces granted control of Kashmir to Gulab Singh, an ethnic Dogra chieftain, who was ruler of the neighboring region of Jammu. Dogra rule was deeply resented by Muslim's in the state, who suffered from widespread discrimination although they formed the majority. Maharaja Hari Singh was Gulab Singh's descendent. In the early 1930s, a popular movement was launched in Kashmir to end the maharaja's rule and establish democracy in the state. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah was one of the leading forces behind the movement.

12 According to most reports, the forces included Pakistan army soldiers and irregulars in civil dress.

13 Instrument of Accession, clause 7. Thus Kashmir retained autonomy in all areas except defense, currency and foreign affairs. As a consequence of Kashmir's conditional accession, article 370 was incorporated in 1949 into the Indian constitution which provided inter alia that other articles of the constitution "may be extended to Kashmir ... only in `consultation' with the state government if it pertains to matters regarding legislative power of Parliament, and with the `concurrence'' of the state government if it pertains to other matters."

14 Following the state's conditional accession to India, Sheikh Abdullah became head of the state's interim administration. He was dismissed and arrested in 1953. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was appointed in his place.

15 Under the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution, governor's rule may be imposed for six months, after which, pursuant to the Constitution of India, president's rule, which permits New Delhi to suspend state government and rule directly, may be enacted for six-month periods. Article 370 of the constitution allows president's rule in Kashmir for only one year at a stretch and only after six months of governor's rule. President's rule was imposed in July 1990. Jammu and Kashmir's legislative assembly was formallydissolved in February 1990.

16 Under Pakistan's late president Zia up-Haq, the ISI gained increased powers over domestic and foreign intelligence operations. The ISI was the conduit for outside covert assistance to the Afghan resistance and has reportedly provided some of that weaponry to a number of militant groups in Kashmir. See Selig S. Harrison, "Showdown in Kashmir," Peace and Security, Vol. 5, Number 3, Autumn 1990, pp. 8-9. See also, Steve Coll, "India, Pakistan Wage Covert `Proxy Wars'," The Washington Post, December 8, 1990.

17 See Sumit Ganguly, "Avoiding War in Kashmir," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1990/91 (1990) p. 65, and Steve Coll, "Kashmiris Describe India Resorting to Arson in Rebel War," The Washington Post, November 16, 1990.

18 See Harinder Baweja, "New Disenchantment," India Today, December 31, 1995.

19 See Chapter VIII. Pakistan's support for pro-independence groups like the JKLF has reportedly waned in favor of pro-Pakistani groups like the Hezb-ul Mujahedin.

20 Estimates of the number of troops vary from 300,000 to 500,000. The government of India has not made accurate figures available.

21 In fact, in April 1993 most of the force went on strike to protest the death in custody of a constable, Riaz Ahmed. After security forces stormed the police headquarters, some 1,000 of the police were disarmed and interrogated.

22 Harinder Baweja and Ramesh Vinayak, "A Dangerous Liaison," India Today, March 15, 1996, p. 53.

23 The name Taliban comes from the Arabic word for student. In Afghanistan, the Taliban organization emerged in 1994 as a movement of religious students against other rebel groups whom they accused of corruption and unIslamic behavior. By 1996, the group controlled most of southern Afghanistan and was entrenched in a protracted struggle with the forces of President Rabbani for control of the capital, Kabul.

24 Harinder Baweja and Ramesh Vinayak, "A Dangerous Liaison," India Today (New Delhi), March 15, 1996, p. 52-53.

25 No precise figures are available on the number of persons killed. Press reports have cited a figure of 20,000 based on hospital and police sources in Kashmir.